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Abstract—Mafia-like organizations are highly dynamic and
organized criminal groups characterized by their extortive activ-
ities that impact societies and economies in different modes and
magnitudes. This renders the understanding of how these orga-
nizations evolved an objective of both scientific and application-
oriented interests. We propose an agent-based simulation model
– the Extortion Racket System model – aimed at understanding
the factors and processes explaining the successful settlement
of the Sicilian Mafia in Southern Italy, and which may more
generally account for the transition from an anarchical situation
of uncoordinated extortion to a monopolistic social order. Our
results show that in situations of anarchy, these organizations do
not last long. This indicates that a monopolistic situation shall be
preferred over anarchical ones. Competition is a necessary and
sufficient condition for the emergence of a monopolistic situation.
However, when competition is combined with protection, the
resulting monopolistic regime presents features that make it even
more preferable and sustainable for the targets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mafia-like organizations are remarkably prosperous organi-
zations originating in Southern Italy at the end of the XIX
century, if not earlier, and now widely spread all over the
country and the rest of the world. They are highly dynamic and
organized criminal groups that impact societies and economies
in different modes and magnitudes [1, 2]. However, their
origins are not yet well understood, mainly due to the lack
of information, which is in part a consequence of their secret
nature.
Two alternative explanations of the origins of the Sicilian
Mafia (henceforth the Mafia), one of the most known and
successful mafia-like organization, have been proposed so far.
On the one hand, the Mafia has been considered as a specific
way of thinking and behaving, and its origins are explained
referring to the concept of mafiosity, a set of attitudes and
values, i.e., a subculture, widespread in the Sicilian society
[3–9].
An alternative explanation that has recently gained large
support among scholars proposes two main factors explaining
the origins of Mafia, (1) the land reforms and (2) the property
rights. These factors were involved in the Sicilian transition
from feudalism to pre-capitalism in the XIX century and in
the typical market structure of the Sicilian region at that time
[10–15].
Following to this view, the Mafia phenomenon developed
when the State was weakly represented in the Sicilian region.
Owing to the debate on the Italian Unification, the citizens
kept their eyes wide open on Rome. Consequently, widespread
criminal activities were freer to engage in repeated raids
against properties and production, thereby creating a chaotic
or anarchical situation all over Sicily.
Those criminal activities mainly consisted in the imposition
of a predatory taxation on landowners, i.e., the extortion
racket. The victims were forced to pay under the threat of
harmful retaliation. Only if they did pay, they suffer no
harm. Extortive activities were uncoordinated and the victims
were exposed to the predatory requests of many competing
roving bandits [16]. This situation induced landowners to hire
reputable violent criminals to control banditry and protect their
land and production [13].
This need for protection1 increased the practice of protection
racketeering, which is defined as “an institutionalized practice
whereby tribute is collected on behalf of a criminal group that,
in exchange, claims to offer (...) protection” [18, p. 140]. The
activity of protection racketeering has been identified as the
Mafia’s typical activity [1, 12, 19, 20], which led Gambetta
[12] to define it as “The Business of Private Protection.”
Schelling [20] noted, however, that protection racket activi-
ties cannot tolerate co-existing extorters. Targets are less likely
to pay more than one extorter per time. Successful racketeering
seems to require a monopolistic regime2. Monopoly, in contrast
to an anarchical situation of uncoordinated extortion, creates
a sort of social order through which, once individuals accept
to pay one extorter, they “do not need to worry about theft by
others” [16].
Consequently, it becomes crucial to understand what are the
factors leading to the achievement of monopolistic situations
and what are the benefits that they may provide over anarchical
ones. Another important issue is that of exploring what factors
may lead to monopolistic situations that are more desirable for
the societies in which extortion activities are endemic.
In our view, the understanding of how mafia-like organiza-
tions may have evolved from uncoordinated groups of roving
bandits into real governments of the underworld is an objective
of both scientific and application-oriented interests. On the
1There are different types of protection that extorters may provide to their
victims, such as protection against themselves, against other rival extortionists,
against business competitors (for a recent analysis of Mafia protection, see
also [17]). In this work, we refer only to protection against other extortionists
who would tax the same targets.
2By monopoly, we refer here to the presence on the territory of only one
criminal organization practicing protection racketeering.
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one hand, it aims to contribute to the general study of the
bases and origins of social order [16, 21]; on the other, it
aims to understand what makes mafia-like organizations so
prosperous and successful: in Italy, criminal organizations of
this type produce a huge tax-free capital, which is calculated
to approximate 7% of the country’s GDP in 2007 [22].
Hence, the present study proposes an agent-based simulation
model – the Extortion Racket System model – aimed at under-
standing the factors and processes explaining the successful
settlement of the Sicilian Mafia, which may more generally
account for the transition from an anarchical situation of
uncoordinated extortion (i.e., widespread banditry) to a mo-
nopolistic social order. The model will test the effects of the
transition from a primitive and anarchical form of extortion
to a monopolistic government of the underworld, both on the
racketeering system and on the whole population.
The model involves the interplay between two types of
agents – Extorters and Targets – and reproduces a situation
in which rival extortive systems exist and compete with
one another. Each extorter behaves according to an extortive
policy that consists of the extortion level (i.e., the amount
of the targets’ endowment requested as extortion money) and
punishment severity (i.e., the amount of punishment effectively
inflicted by the extorter on the target that did not pay the
extortion request). The extorters’ goal is to extort the targets
in their domain and to expand such domain by competing with
other extorters, thereby providing a sort of weak protection
to their targets. Alternatively, the extorters may reproduce a
strong protection, in which they provide a more active shelter
to their targets. The model enables the verification of the ef-
fects of competition among extorters on the extortion systems
themselves and on the targets, as well as the observation of
the separate and combined effects of both types of protection.
The Extortion Racket System model aims to test the fol-
lowing research questions:
1) How to explain the transition from an anarchical and
uncoordinated extortive situation to a monopolistic one?
What are the minimal factors that suffice to bring about
a monopolistic regime?
2) What is the effect of either regime, anarchical and mo-
nopolistic, on the targets?
3) What is the effect of either regime on the extorters? In
particular, what is the effect of the monopolistic regime
on the profile and behavior of the surviving extorters?
We hypothesize that (1) a monopolistic regime is required
for an extortion racket system to be successfully and steadily
settled; (2) a monopolistic regime is preferred by the targets
over an anarchical one; (3) the competition among extorters
plays a key role in the transition from an anarchical and
uncoordinated extortive situation to a monopolistic one; and
(4) the strong protection enables the selection, among those
competing, of the relatively most sustainable extortive system
to become the monopolist.
As we will see, our results show that competition among
extorters for defining and enlarging their domains leads to a
monopolistic situation that generates advantages for both the
targets and the extorters compared to an anarchical situation. In
anarchical situations, the burden on targets is always greater
than when a monopoly of any type is achieved. Moreover,
anarchical situations of non-regulated extortion are shown to
be not sustainable in the long-term since they are characterized
by high rate of punishment, resulting in the rapid death of all
targets and consequently of extorters. Results also show that
when competition is combined with a strong protection, in
which extorters that proved successful actively discourage their
competitors from victimizing their own targets, advantages
for the latter follow. In particular, a preferable monopolistic
situation for the targets is achieved compared to the one
achieved by competition alone: the presence of strong pro-
tection both speeds up the achievement of a monopolistic
situation and favors the transition to a government of the
underworld, in which the extortion burden and the level of
punishment on targets decreases, while the number of survival
targets increases.
The paper will unfold as follows. In Section II, we describe
the Extortion Racket System model aimed to check the re-
search questions we posed above. Next, we discuss the results
we have obtained so far in Section III. Finally, we provide
some conclusions as well as some ideas for future work in
Section IV.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
This simulation model represents a world populated by
extorters and possible targets of extortion.
Fig. 1: Two-layer simulation model structure.
To help visualize our model, we structure it in two layers
(see Figure 1). The top layer is populated with extorters (E =
{e1, . . . , en}, where n is the total number of extorters in the
model (n = |E|)), while the bottom layer with targets (T =
{t1, . . . , tm}, where m is the total number of targets in the
model (m = |T |)). The extorters interact among themselves
and with the targets for a specified number of rounds.
The extorters’ basic activity is to extort targets and their
goals are: (1) to receive extortion payment from as many
targets as possible, and (2) to expand their domains as much
as possible by providing protection to their targets.
Each extorter behaves according to its own extortive policy
that remains unchanged over time. Each policy can be seen
as an extorter’s profile and consists in the combination of two
traits: extortion level and punishment severity.
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The extortion level refers to the amount of the targets’
endowment requested under a more or less frightening men-
ace, while the punishment severity represents the amount of
punishment effectively inflicted by the extorter on the target in
case of non-payment. Punishment is costly both to the target
receiving it and to the extorter inflicting it as the extorter
spends resources to inflict the punishment.
We characterize an extorter as an agent having the following
set of attributes, see Table I.
TABLE I: Extorter’s agent attributes.
Attributes Description
Wealth Accumulated extortion received.
Targets List of targets to extort.
Enlargement Probability of incorporating a new (randomly selected)
Probability target in the extorter’s domain.
Protection Flag indicating whether the extorter tries or not
Provision to protect its targets from other extorters.
Extortion Percentage of the target’s income demanded as extortion.Level
Punishment Percentage of the target’s income inflicted as punishment.Severity
Cost of Percentage of the extorter’s wealth inflicted as cost on
Fighting the opponent extorter.
Cost of Percentage of the punishment inflicted paid as cost by
Punishing the extorter.
Targets are entrepreneurs that operate businesses (e.g., su-
permarkets, building companies, retail shops), which generate
regular earnings. Their aim is to minimize the amount of
earnings spent in paying extortion and in receiving punishment
when not complying with the extortive request. Targets are
agents with the following set of attributes, see Table II.
TABLE II: Target’s agent attributes.
Attributes Description
Wealth Accumulated income.
Income Earning received at each round.
Each target keeps also a record of the punishments and
successful protections received from each of the extorters it
interacted with. This piece of information is used by the target
for ranking the extorters whenever it cannot afford paying
all extortion requests (see Equation 1). Initially, the targets
have just an estimation of the information, which they update
whenever they have direct interactions with the extorters.
In the initialization simulation stage, the same number of
targets is assigned to each extorter. The targets assigned to an
extorter are referred to as the extorter’s domain.
Assignment is performed according to the Pseudo-
Algorithm 1, in which a new target randomly selected (line
4) is assigned to each extorter with a probability that varies
according to the number of extorters already assigned to extort
Pseudo-Algorithm 1 Initial definition of the extorters’ do-
main.
1: repeat
2: for all extorter do
3: while target not assigned do
4: Select a target randomly
5: if (target is not assigned to this extorter) then
6: probability ← 1 / Number extorters assigned to
this target
7: if (random number < probability) then
8: Assign target to this extorter
9: end if
10: end if
11: end while
12: end for
13: until all targets are assigned to more than one extorter
that specific target (line 6 – 9). This happens until all targets
are assigned to more than one extorter (line 13).
This assignment procedure is aimed at reproducing an an-
archical situation, characterized by all targets initially having
more than one extorter demanding payment, and all extorters
initially having the same number of targets to extort. The
underlying idea is that prior to the Mafia consolidation, as
evidence shows, there was no clear territorial separation among
groups. Extorters needed to keep, defend, and expand their
domains by competing with other extorters for the same
limited resources (i.e., targets).
Each extorter’s profile, consisting of the extortion level
and punishment severity, is also defined in the initialization
stage. The extortion level is randomly selected by applying
a uniform distribution from 0% to 100%; also punishment
severity is randomly selected on a uniform distribution, but
the possibilities are limited between the extortion level value
assigned to the extorter and 100%. For instance, if the extortion
level randomly assigned to an extorter is 60%, then the
punishment severity will be randomly selected from 60% to
100%.
Once completed the initialization stage, extorters and targets
interact for several rounds, following the steps illustrated in
Figure 2.
Each round begins with the targets receiving their incomes
that result from regular business activities. This income varies
among targets representing different businesses’ type and size.
In stage 1 (Figure 2), each extorter is assigned its own list of
targets to extort, which represents its domain; however, it is
also endowed with a given probability (Enlargement Proba-
bility, see Table I) to increase its domain by one new target.
Once defined its new domain, extorters define how much to
extort from each target (Decide Extorting, see Figure 2), which
corresponds to the target’s income multiplied by the extorter’s
extortion level. Then in stage 2, extorters make their extortive
request to their targets (Demand Extortion, see Figure 2).
In the third stage (Decide Paying Extortion, see Figure 2),
each target checks whether they can afford paying all the
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Fig. 2: Sequence diagram of the agents’ interaction.
demanded extortions (i.e., they check whether their income is
greater than or equal to the sum of all the extortions received).
If so, it proceeds straight to stage 4 as it can afford paying
all the extortion requests; otherwise, the target is forced to
establish a preferential order among extorters. In order to rank
them, the target assigns each extorter demanding extortion
with a convenience value calculated according to Equation 1.
Ci = Exti +
((
n∑
j=1,i 6=j
Punj × probPunj
)
× probProti
)
(1)
where,
• i and j ∈ E.
• Ci is the convenience value assigned to extorter i.
• Exti is the amount demanded as extortion by extorter i.
• Punj is the punishment inflicted by extorter j in case it
does not receive the extortion payment.
• probPunj is the probability of the target being punished
by extorter j in case of non-payment of extortion. This
probability is calculated based on the outcomes of previ-
ous interactions of this target with the same extorter j,
considering those interactions in which the target has not
paid the extorter j.
• probProti is the probability of the target being protected
by extorter i in case the latter is paid. This probability is
calculated based on the outcomes of previous interactions
with the same extorter i in which the latter successfully
protected the target from extortions.
This convenience value is based on a simple algorithm
aimed at minimizing the target’s losses when selecting which
extorters to pay. It combines the extortion demanded by the
evaluated extorter and the potential protection service that the
extorter may provide against other extorters. Based on the
extorters’ convenience value, the target sorts the extorters list
in ascending order. It means that the target prefers to pay the
lowest extortion and to receive the lowest punishment by all
the unpaid extorters.
Then in stage 4, the target pays all or as many extorters it
can afford to pay (Pay Extortion, see Figure 2), starting from
the top to the bottom of its ranking extorters conveniences’
list.
In stage 5, those extorters that did not receive payment
decide whether to punish or not the targets that have not
paid extortion (Punish, see Figure 2). The inflicted punishment
reduces the target’s wealth, but also imposes a cost on the pun-
isher (Cost of Punishing, see Table I). Once punished, the tar-
get updates the extorters’ punishment probability (probPunj ,
see Equation 1). The incentive for punishing is the increased
probability of the extortion’s success in the next round.
Stages 6 and 7 depend on whether the Provider Protection
extorter’s attribute is enabled (see Table I). If so, the extorter
goes through these stages; otherwise, it proceeds to stage
8, which means that the extorter does not provide strong
protection to its targets.
In stage 6, extorters with the Provider Protection attribute
enabled that received extortion payment (henceforth protec-
tors) face a new decision, namely whether or not to fight
against other extorters that tried to extort the same tar-
get (henceforth opponents) (Decide Fighting to Protect, see
Figure 2). Fighting, which reproduces what we call strong
protection, results in a reduced probability that one’s targets
will receive others’ extortion demands in the future, and in a
reduced risk that they will pay any of these [23]. The protector
decides to fight only weaker or equally strong opponents,
according to Equation 2.
wealthp
wealthmax
+
numTargetp
numTargetmax
≥ wealtho
wealthmax
+
numTargeto
numTargetmax
(2)
where,
• wealthp and numTargetp are respectively the wealth
and the number of targets of the protector extorter.
• wealtho and numTargeto are respectively the wealth
and the number of targets of the opponent extorter.
• wealthmax is the maximum of the protector and oppo-
nent extorters’ wealth.
• numTargetmax is the maximum of the protector and
opponent extorters’ number of targets.
If the protector decides to fight (Fight to Protect, see
Figure 2), then in stage 7 both extorters suffer a reduction
in their wealth (Cost of Fighting, see Table I) according to the
Lanchester’s N-Square rule [24, 25]. This rule states that when
fighting, both extorters (protector and opponent) lose wealth,
but each extorter loses wealth proportionate to the adversary’s
wealth. This means that the wealthier extorter has a greater
impact on the less wealthy one, and there is no winner in
such situation as both lose. The incentive for the protector
to fight against its opponents is that of increasing the wealth
difference between itself (stronger) and the opponent (weaker).
This increased difference may then force the latter to give up
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the target or die (i.e., successful protection). The emergent
effect of strong protection is that of building a reputation of
reliable protector.
In stage 8, unpaid extorters decide whether or not to fight
against opponents (Decide Fighting, see Figure 2). This fight-
ing decision is also based on Equation 2 in which the extorter
decides to fight only weaker or equally strong opponents. The
incentive for fighting is a resulting larger wealth difference
from opponents, to the point that these might possibly quit
the market. The long-term emergent effect is instead a reduced
number of competitors, and finally a monopolistic situation in
which both the targets and the extorters are better off than
they are in an anarchical and uncoordinated regime. In stage
9, if the extorter decides to fight (Fight, see Figure 2) the cost
of fighting is calculated also on the basis of the Lanchester’s
N-Square rule.
Finally, in stage 10 each extorter decides whether or not
to renounce (Decide to Renounce, see Figure 2) the targets
it unsuccessfully tried to extort. Renouncing means that the
extorter will remove the targets from its domain. Three con-
ditions must be satisfied for renouncing a target:
1) the extorter did not receive payment from the target;
2) the extorter was attacked by a protector of that target; and
3) the extorter did not attack anyone to protect that target.
If the extorter succeeds in leading others to renounce a
target, or, otherwise stated, in protecting it, the target will
keep track of this information and will update the protection
probability concerning that extorter. This piece of information
will obviously affect the target’s ranking of future extorters
(see Equation 1).
At the end of each round, the extorter dies if its wealth is
not higher than 0 or if it has no targets to extort. In the former
case, its targets will be redistributed to the extorters that fought
for them. The target dies if its wealth is not higher than 0.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section describes a simulation experiment aimed at
answering the posed research questions and check the validity
of our hypotheses presented in Section I. The simulation
experiment includes three treatments, as shown in Table III.
These treatments vary by just one feature. The no-
competition treatment differs from the other two because
extorters do not compete among themselves. By contrast, the
competition & no-strong-protection and competition & strong-
protection treatments differ as to the provision of the strong
protection service to the targets. In the former treatment,
extorters provide no active protection service to the targets:
paid extorters do not fight against other possible extorters;
in the latter treatment, the paid extorters have the option to
provide active protection to their targets.
For each treatment, the simulation model was run 50 times
with different random seeds and targets, but with the same
set of extorters’ profile randomly chosen once at the begin of
the experiment. The input parameters used in the simulations
are: extorters’ profile (see Table IVa), extorters’ attribute initial
TABLE III: Experimental treatments.
Treatment Description
No-Competition
Extorters do not compete among themselves,
meaning that they do not fight. Extorters
demand extortion to the target and punish
those that do not pay.
Competition &
Extorters that receive extortion do not protect
No-Strong-Protection
(Protection Provision disabled, see Table I)
the extorted target from other extorters.
Extorters that are not paid, first punish
the targets that did not pay, and then decide
whether to fight or not in order to increase
the probability of expanding their domain.
Competition &
Extorters that are paid may fight in order to
Strong-Protection
protect their extorted targets (Protection
Provision enabled, see Table I) and increase
their chance of being paid in the future.
Extorters that are not paid decide whether to
fight or not in order to increase the probability
of expanding their domain.
TABLE IV: Input parameters.
(a) Extorters’ profiles used in the
experiment.
Extortion Punishment
Level Severity
70% 90%
30% 40%
80% 100%
90% 100%
40% 50%
60% 70%
80% 90%
100% 100%
20% 20%
50% 70%
60% 90%
10% 60%
20% 90%
30% 70%
70% 80%
50% 50%
10% 20%
40% 100%
100% 100%
90% 90%
(b) Extorters’ attributes initial value.
Attributes Value
Number of Extorters 20
Wealth 1000
Enlargement Probability 10%
Targets 422
Cost of Fighting 3%
Cost of Punishing 33.3%
(c) Targets’ attributes initial value.
Attributes Value
Number of 2000Targets
Wealth 1000
Income
Initialized with a base
value chosen between
300 and 1000 using a
uniform distribution.
At each round, it varies
this value from 90% to
110%
values (see Table IVb), and targets’ attribute initial values (see
Table IVc).
This work has been realized within the FP7 European
Project GLODERS and the input parameters’ values have
been inferred from empirical work conducted in Sicily by the
GLODERS’ partner affiliated with the University of Palermo
[26, 27]. These data were collected through interviews of ex-
torted entrepreneurs, judicial documents and confiscated Mafia
documents analyses (e.g., the Libro Mastro, an accounting
Mafia’s book). These analyses corroborate the assumption that
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the punishment severity inflicted by the Mafia in case of non-
payment is often greater than the extortion demanded, as well
as that the Mafia extortion request differs depending on the
type of business extorted.
The analyses of the treatments are based on a set of output
metrics described in Table V, which values are calculated as
the average of the results of the 50 simulation runs carried on
for each treatment.
TABLE V: Output metrics.
Metric Description
Number of The number of extorters active on the simulation.Extorters
Number of The number of targets active on the simulation.Targets
Speed to The number of rounds to achieve monopoly.Monopoly
Extortion Proportion of the targets’ income spent on
Burden paying extortion.
Extortion x Proportion of demanded extortions that triggered
Punishment punishment.
Losses due Proportion of the targets’ income lost because
to punishment of punishment.
Here is a summary of the main results. Figures 3a – 3d
show the graphics of the dynamics of the no-competition
(dotted line) and competition & no-strong-protection (solid
line) treatments.
Due to the lack of competition among extorters in the no-
competition treatment, targets face an anarchical situation in
which they are exposed to requests from all possible extorters,
causing their death, and consequently that of all extorters
approximately at round 700.
In this treatment, targets’ death is ignited at the beginning of
the simulation as each target receives on average four extortive
requests (this number is specific for the settings in Tables IVa –
IVc and it may vary according to the ratio between targets and
extorters). Thus targets that cannot bear to pay all of these
demanded extortions are punished, and consequently many of
them die, as the steep decrease in the number of targets of
Figure 3b shows (from 2000 to around 500 targets in the initial
rounds). In the subsequent rounds, the proportion of targets’
income used to pay extortion increases (see Figure 3c), and the
targets become incrementally unable to pay all of the extortive
requests; this in turn inflates the number of punishments (see
Figure 3d), and consequently the number of targets’ deaths.
As the number of targets diminishes, some extorters see their
domains shrinking until they get to zero, what also causes
their death. The situation evolves by the remaining extorters
enlarging their domains, what slowly leads to the death of all
the other targets and subsequently of the extorters.
The no-competition treatment represents a situation of
predatory extortion, in which the extorters do not create any
long-term relationship with their victims. They attempt to ex-
tort them, without caring about their survival. Moreover, they
use violence as deterrence. Our results show that anarchical
situations of non-regulated extortions are not sustainable in the
long-term since they are characterized by predatory extortions
and high levels of punishments, resulting in the rapid death of
all targets and consequently of all extorters. Hence, as claimed
by [16, p. 568] “In a world of roving banditry there is little
or no incentive for anyone to produce or accumulate anything
that may be stolen and, thus, little for bandits to steal.”.
Instead, competition allows the situation to evolve from
an anarchic violent situation to a regime of one stationary
bandit (see the competition & no-strong-protection treatment
in Figure 3a) who monopolizes the taxation (i.e., extortion),
thus allowing for the emergence of a more acceptable situation
for the targets. In it, only a portion of their income is stolen
through extortion (see Figure 3c) and they do not have to worry
about the theft of others [16]3. In this sense, competition acts
as a sort of weak or soft protection, in which targets, though
victimized by one bandit, are at least freed from all others.
At the same time, competition selects among extortive
systems, sorting out the successful ones. What makes an
extorter succeed and survives competitors? The probability of
obtain payment from targets. In turn, such a probability is
determined by the extortion level: when this is reasonable [see
10], the targets are able to sustain the costs. Hence, no state
of generalized violence, causing the death of all the targets, is
triggered. Competition is an important factor of protection in
two ways: (1) it brings about a monopolistic regime, which
is more tolerable for targets than anarchy; (2) it leads to the
selection of the most successful competitor, which turns to
be the most likely to be paid, or, ultimately, to the extorter
that makes the most acceptable requests. Competition among
extorters seems a sufficient condition for a basic form of social
order to settle.
Let us now compare the competition & no-strong-protection
treatment’s results with the competition & strong-protection
ones.
Figure 4a depicts the evolution of the number of extorters
in the no-strong-protection (dotted line) and strong-protection
(solid line) treatments. In both, the situation evolves from an
anarchical into a monopolistic situation, determined by the
survival of only one active extorter. In the former treatment,
however, the monopolistic regime is reached in a shorter period
of time, occurring approximately at round 90, while in the
latter treatment, the same regime needs around 250 rounds
to emerge. This time difference derives mostly from the fact
that the activity of protection provision raises significantly the
initial number of fights (see Figure 4e and Table VII) between
extorters in comparison to the no-strong-protection treatment
and consequently the number of extorters’ death.
Besides reducing the frequency and severity of violence and
3Once a monopoly is achieved, the monopolistic extorter may have an
incentive to increase the extortion demand, which may create a favorable
environment for the emergence of other competing extorters leading to the
competition dynamics once again. Even though this is an interesting aspect
to analyze, this work focuses only on the process leading to monopoly
achievement, not in its evolution after the achievement.
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(a) Number of Extorters. (b) Number of Targets.
(c) Proportion of target’s income spent on paying extortion. (d) Proportion of extortions demanded that resulted in punishment.
Fig. 3: Dynamics of no-competition (dotted line) and competition & no-strong-protection (solid line) treatments. The vertical
dashed line in the graphics indicates the moment in which a monopolistic regime is achieved in one of the treatments. By this,
we mean a situation in which there is only one active extorter in the environment. The x-axis unit of all the graphics indicates
the number of simulation rounds.
the time needed to reach monopoly, strong protection has fur-
ther positive effects on targets. As shown in Figures 4d and 4f,
strong protection results in a reduced, respectively, frequency
and severity of punishment inflicted on the targets that refused
to pay. It therefore makes the number of surviving targets
increase (see Figure 4b), and leads to an increasing amount of
resources targets are left with, after they have paid extortions
(see Figure 4c). Additionally, Figure 4c also shows that
after the monopoly has been achieved, the level of extortion
requested is higher with strong protection than without. This
seems to indicate that strong protection makes the extortion
burden more tolerable for targets, and the power of successful
extorters more stable.
Analyzing numerically the effects of only competition vs
competition plus strong protection with respect to the metrics
affecting targets’ welfare, we observe a statistical significant
improvement for all of them (see Table VI, column Student’s
T-Test p-value). An interesting finding noticeable in Table VI
is that not only the targets benefit from active protection pro-
vided by extorters, but also the monopolistic extorter benefits
from it, as its wealth is 55.43% larger in the latter treatment.
Entering in more details about the monopolistic extorters,
Tables VII and VIII show the ranking of extorters beginning
from the extorter that survived longest to the extorter that
survived the least, respectively in the no-strong-protection
and strong-protection treatments. The main difference between
these treatments is the number of punishments inflicted to
the targets that resist paying extortion, which is always sig-
nificantly lower in the protection treatment than in the non-
protection treatment. Exceptions are the last 8 extorters, which
in both treatments have a short life, only 2 rounds, showing
that there is an early elimination of extorters with an exceeding
extortive demand (higher than or equal to 70%).
Another interesting difference between these two treatments
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(a) Number of Extorters. (b) Number of Targets.
(c) Proportion of target’s income spent on paying extortion. (d) Proportion of extortions demanded that resulted in punishment.
(e) Number of fights among extorters. (f) Severity of punishment inflicted.
Fig. 4: Dynamics of competition & no-strong-protection (dotted line) and competition & strong-protection (solid line) treatments.
The vertical dashed line in the graphics indicates the moment in which a monopolistic regime is achieved in one of the
treatments. By this, we mean a situation in which there is only one active extorter in the environment. The x-axis unit of all
the graphics indicates the number of simulation rounds.
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TABLE VI: Output metrics considered for the analysis of the model.
Metric
Competition & Competition & Student’s
No-Protection Protection T-Test
Mean Standard Mean Standard p-valueDeviation Deviation (α = 0.05)
Number of Alive Targets 1,296.52 61.62 1,719.68 35.22 2.2 × 10−16
Total Wealth of Alive Targets 99,959,199.00 15,759,955.00 178,787,543.00 535,7493.00 2.2 × 10−16
Wealth of the Monopolistic Extorter 64,198,555.00 16,581,454.00 99,790,153.00 381,1173.00 2.2 × 10−16
TABLE VII: Rank of extorters in the competition & no-strong-
protection treatment.
Rank Extortion Punishment Number of Extortion xLevel Severity Punishments Punishment
1 40% 100% 432.1 0.59%
2 60% 90% 1533.8 4.05%
3 50% 50% 1978.26 21.91%
4 50% 70% 2918.34 3.43%
5 40% 50% 1246.96 4.02%
6 30% 70% 404.88 1.95%
7 30% 40% 490.88 2.84%
8 60% 70% 723.46 36.17%
9 20% 90% 74.34 0.81%
10 20% 20% 239.96 3.59%
11 10% 60% 30.1 0.87%
12 10% 20% 68.62 2.03%
13 100% 100% 442.5 24.98%
14 80% 100% 423.06 23.86%
15 90% 90% 438.74 24.81%
16 70% 80% 393.92 22.19%
17 100% 100% 442.96 25.00%
18 90% 100% 438.22 24.72%
19 80% 90% 429.52 24.23%
20 70% 90% 361.28 20.34%
is the ranking position of high punishers, which is always
lower in the strong-protection treatment than in the no-
strong-protection treatment. This means that in the former
treatment the most violent extorters (i.e., those that punish
more severely) are eliminated earlier than in the case when
strong-protection is not available, thus significantly reducing
the targets’ losses (i.e., amount of wealth spent on paying
punishment, see Figure 4c).
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The Extortion Racket System model is aimed at understand-
ing how social order may emerge from anarchical situation of
uncoordinated extortion (i.e., widespread banditry). It focuses
on the factors and processes that may lead from an anarchical
and chaotic situation to a monopolistic social order, in par-
ticular, it is aimed at answering some research questions, by
testing the following 4 hypotheses: (1) a monopolistic regime
is required for an extortion racket system to be successfully
and steadily settled; (2) a monopolistic regime is preferred by
the targets over an anarchical one; (3) the competition among
extorters plays a key role in the transition from an anarchical
and uncoordinated extortive situation to a monopolistic one;
and (4) the strong protection enables the selection, among
TABLE VIII: Rank of extorters in the competition & strong-
protection treatment.
Rank Extortion Punishment Number of Extortion xLevel Severity Punishments Punishment
1 40% 100% 43.2 0.04%
2 30% 70% 114.2 0.12%
3 50% 70% 843.94 3.36%
4 60% 90% 845.72 3.74%
5 40% 50% 679.26 2.96%
6 30% 40% 246.32 1.53%
7 20% 90% 18.62 0.12%
8 50% 50% 410.08 17.56%
9 20% 20% 122.16 2.05%
10 10% 60% 9.62 0.33%
11 60% 70% 321.14 18.22%
12 10% 20% 15.42 0.58%
13 100% 100% 442.5 24.98%
14 90% 90% 423.18 23.87%
15 80% 100% 439.88 24.82%
16 70% 80% 393.88 22.19%
17 100% 100% 442.96 25.00%
18 90% 100% 438.28 24.73%
19 80% 90% 429.22 24.21%
20 70% 90% 361.12 20.33%
those competing, of the relatively most sustainable extortive
system to become the monopolist.
Our results show that in situations of anarchy, extortion
racket systems do not last long: they dissolve soon because
they cannot sustain the rebellion and consequent death of their
targets (Hypothesis 1). Moreover, the level of extortion paid
by the targets is always lower whenever a monopoly of any
type is achieved. This results in a situation in which both the
monopolistic extorter and the targets are better off: targets do
not need to worry about the thefts of other extorters, they
are left with a certain capital after paying the extortion, and
therefore have an incentive to save and to invest, thereby
increasing future income that the extorter can benefit from.
Monopolistic situation shall then be preferred over anarchical
ones, because as claimed by Olson [16, p. 568] “In a world
of roving banditry there is little or no incentive for anyone to
produce or accumulate anything that may be stolen and, thus,
little for bandits to steal.” (Hypothesis 2).
Moreover, results show that competition is a necessary
and sufficient condition for the emergence of a monopolistic
situation (Hypothesis 3). However, when competition is com-
bined with strong protection, the resulting monopolistic regime
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presents features that make it more preferable and sustainable
for the targets than the one emerging from competition alone.
The strong protection of the subjects against other possible
extorters favors the rapid emergence of a government of the
underworld in which a peaceful order is provided (since less
punishment has to be used to convince targets to pay) and
more resources are left to the targets (Hypothesis 4).
In future work, we intend to enable agents to improve their
performance by dynamically adapting their extortive demands
and punishment severity (i.e., their profile) to the context in
which they interact. Additionally, we may enable them to form
coalitions instead of only competing among themselves, which
may enable the representation and analysis of different types of
mafia-like organizations, such as ’Ndrangheta and Camorra.
We also may enable the entry of new extorters that may
challenge the dominance of a monopolist in order to validate
the dominant resistance against new comers.
APPENDIX
GLOSSARY
Follows a glossary with the definition of the most important
concepts used in the paper.
• Anarchy is characterized by a target having more than
one extorter demanding extortion payment.
• Monopoly is characterized by the presence on the territory
of only one extortion system practicing racketeering.
• Extortion Level is the amount of the targets’ endowment
requested as extortion money.
• Punishment Severity is the amount of punishment in-
flicted by the extorter on the target that did not pay
extortion.
• Fighting is a situation in which an extorter attempts of
harming or gaining power over another extorter.
• Competition (or weak protection) is the fight started by
an extorter that did not receive extortion payment.
• Protection (or strong protection) is the fight started by
an extorter that did receive extortion payment. Strong
protection provides a more active shelter to its targets
compared to competition (weak protection).
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